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VOL. 83 JANUARY 1983 NO. 1
Marbury and the Administrative State
Henry P. Monaghan*
Marbury v. Madison's' prominence as a constitutional decision has long
deflected interest in examining its other implications. But prior to proclaiming
judicial competence to invalidate an act of Congress, the Court sustained
judicial authority to enforce the specific statutory duties of administrative
officials.2 Had the doctrine of separation of powers been understood from the
beginning to bar any judicial control of administrative power, the constitu-
tional scheme would have gone seriously awry at the outset. Congressional
directives either would have been subordinated to the will of the executive
department or would have generated collateral and unseemly struggles be-
tween the two branches of government. 3 Moreover, a conception of public
administration free from judicial oversight would have damaged the funda-
mental political axiom of limited government and thus undermined in advance
a principal buttress for the legitimacy of the modern "administrative state."
' 4
At least where private interests are sharply implicated, some measure of
judicial review is a "necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally
valid." '5 These concerns seem to have been acknowledged even by those
specialists in public administration most prominently associated with efforts
to narrow the claims for judicial control in favor of an emphasis on hierarchi-
cally structured, intra-administrative accountability. 6
*Visiting Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1955, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst; LL.B. 1958, Yale University; LL.M. 1960, Harvard University.
1. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. Id. at 168-73 (sanctioning such judicial control where necessary to protect "vested
rights"). Much of the argument centered on the power of the courts to control executive officials.
Id. at 138-48.
3. More focused contentions of exclusive presidential responsibility to secure official compli-
ance with law stemming from the President's implied removal power and his express duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," U.S. Const. art. 2, § 3, were decisively laid to rest in
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838), particularly in Judge
Cranch's opinion in the circuit court, 26 F. Cas. 702, 713-14, 745, 753 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No.
15,517). See Grundstein, Presidential Power, Administration and Administrative Law, 18 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 285, 309-21 (1950).
4. J. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Govern-
ment 3 (1978) ("This shift in the center of gravity of governmental powers has become so
pronounced that contemporary political scientists, with increasing regularity, describe America as
an administrative state."). I use the term administrative agency in the conventional sense, so as to
include both the independent regulatory agencies and all parts of the executive branch administer-
ing congressional programs.
5. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 320 (1965).
6. See, e.g., F. Goodnow, The Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States bk.
6 (1905); Goodnow, Private Rights and Administrative Discretion, 6 Ky. L.J. 311 (1908). Com-
pare the limited role assigned to judicial review in Freund, The Law of the Administration in
America, 9 Pol. Sci. Q. 403 (1894), with the role suggested in L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 475-83.
See also Note, Regulatory Analyses and Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 91 Yale L.J.
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The existence of judicial review of administrative action leaves open a
large question about its scope. Marbury has relevance here too, for it is among
the Court's first encounters with the propriety of judicial deference to admin-
istrative interpretation of statutes. In determining whether Mr. Marbury was
legally entitled to his commission, the Court asserted categorically that "ihe
question whether a right [to the commission] has vested or not is, in its nature,
judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority." ' 7 There is no hint of
acquiescence in a reasonable but contrary administrative interpretation of the
relevant congressional legislation" in Marbury's much quoted pronouncement
that "[iut is emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." 9 Marshall's grand conception of judicial autonomy in law declaration
was not in terms or in logic limited to constitutional interpretation, and taken
at face value seemed to condemn the now entrenched practice of judicial
deference to administrative construction of law. It is Marbury's pertinence to
this practice that I intend to examine in this Article.
I. Ti PROBLEM ELABORATED
Despite its landmark status in administrative law, Marbury had all but
disappeared from sight amidst the amazing proliferation of twentieth-century
administrative law cases. Its relevance on the question of the scope of review
of administrative interpretation of law suddenly resurfaced, however, in the
debates over Senator Dale Bumpers's crusade to curb judicial deference to
statutory interpretation made by federal administrative agencies. In 1975,
Senator Bumpers proposed to modify the Administrative Procedure Act to
require, inter alia, that "the reviewing court shall de novo decide all relevant
questions of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions."' 1
"The Bumpers amendment is simple," said Senator Exon, one of its sup-
porters, "[i]t takes away the now court-recognized principle that a Federal
agency's interpretation of Federal law is presumed to be correct.""
While the precise demands of the various forms of the Bumpers amend-
ment have been viewed by many as anything but simple,' 2 my concern is with
739, 742-43 (1982) (suggesting open administrative procedures coupled with "oversight ... by
Congress, experts in various disciplines, and the public").
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 167.
8. That the right did not vest until delivery of the commission was certainly a plausible view.
United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 47 (1932) ("[Tihe Executive Department has not always
treated an appointment as complete upon the mere signing of a commission." (footnote omit-
ted)).
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
10. S. 2408, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) (intended to amend 5 U.S.C. § 706). This require-
ment was joined with a prohibition against a judicial presumption "that any rule or regulation of
any agency is valid."
11. 125 Cong. Rec. S12,165 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979). Senator Exon was referring to a slightly
different version of the proposed amendment, appearing at id. at S12,145. See Levin, Report in
Support of Recommendation 79-6, Judicial Review and the Bumpers Amendment, 1979 Recom-
mendations & Reps., Admin. Conf. of the U.S. 565, 567.
12. The current form of the amendment appears as § 203 of H.R. 746, Regulatory Procedure
Act of 1982, in H.R. Rep. No. 435, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Bumpers Amendment]. See infra text accompanying notes 180-83. For an examination of the
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its animating no-judicial-deference principle. Trumpeted as a necessary check
upon federal bureaucratic insensitivity and unresponsiveness,' 3 it was on occa-
sion supported by references to Marbury. The "duty of the judicial depart-
ment" there posited, it was insisted, prohibits any judicial deference to admin-
istrative interpretation of law. 14 As Senator Bumpers put it, "[u]nder this
amendment, the judiciary will simply be required to carry out exactly what
their duty is; that is, where they would have reached a different conclusion, it
is their duty to reach a different conclusion."' 5
While never more than a makeweight in the debates over the amendment,
the Marbury argument is considerably more interesting than acknowledged by
its somewhat perplexed opponents.' 6 Thirty years ago Professor Henry Hart,
also invoking Marbury, advanced a strikingly similar, albeit more limited,
"no-deference" thesis as part of his "Dialogue" on congressional power to
regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 17 The Dialogue is widely and
rightly praised, but its votaries pay no heed to the strictures Hart thought were
required in judicial review of administrative construction of law; in fact, this
strand of the Dialogue seems universally to have been ignored.
But the problem it addresses cannot be ignored. The propriety of judicial
deference to agency interpretation of law is an issue of systemic importance to
the theory and practice of administrative law.' 8 The case law seems inconsist-
ent. As in Marbury, the Court frequently proffers its own judgment on the
meaning of the statute, considering the agency position simply as a relevant
Bumpers amendment in the form it was initially proposed, see McGowan, Congress, Court and
the Control of Delegated Powers, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 1162-68 (1977); Woodward & Levin,
In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 Ad. L. Rev. 329 (1979). On the
various changes, see Levin, supra note 11, and O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study
of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 739 (1980).
13. Amendment supporters reflected both business and grassroots opposition to what was
perceived to be the excesses of the federal bureaucracy. In contrast, the amendment's opponents
have tended to be drawn from those, including academics and judges, still retaining confidence in
a system of national policy making. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 749-56.
14. E.g., 122 Cong. Rec. 22,012 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers). See also Levin, supra
note 11, at 582.
15. 125 Cong. Rec. S12,148 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979).
16. E.g., Levin, supra note 11, at 582 n.76.
17. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953), reprinted in P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H.
Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 330-60 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Hart & Wechsler]. For convenience, citations to the Dialogue will be made to
Hart & Wechsler.
18. There are, I recognize, those who deny that court-agency interaction can be helpfully
understood in terms of such concepts as judicial deference to administrative interpretation of law.
E.g., Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 771, 780-81
(1975) ("The rules governing judicial review have no more substance at the core than a seedless
grape .... "). Some modern-day writers would, indeed, dismiss such an issue as simply masking
the real determinant of judicial conduct: acceptability of result. Any such judicial conduct-and
no one doubts that there is some, if not so much as the realists believe-is, however, normatively
unacceptable. Whether in the hands of judges or scholars, such a result-oriented jurisprudence
does not provide a theory of adjudication; in reducing the judicial role to that of another political
organ, it does not tell us what judges should do if they are to be faithful to their commissions as
judges.
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"body of experience and informed judgment."' 1 On other occasions, how-
ever, the Court seems willing to be bound by the administrative interpretation,
so long as it has a "reasonable basis in law," ' 20 or "is not irrational." 2'
In part, the apparently erratic pattern of the case law reflects the indeter-
minacy in the concepts of "law" and "deference." Indeed, some commenta-
tors would insist that the term "law" cannot be adequately differentiated
from related concepts, with the result that it cannot meaningfully serve as a
vehicle for allocating functions between court and agency.22 No doubt this
epistemological skepticism has merit in emphasizing the difficulties endemic to
our legal categories.2 3 But these categories can be neither discarded as vestigal
remains of primitive word magic, nor dissolved by appeals to epistemology,
or, I might add, to literary theory.2 4 They are practical constructs designed to
systematize, order, and control certain forms of social experience. 25 The
concept of a "legal question" is a centrally important ordering device for
allocating and distributing regulative authority among the various actors in
the legal system. That this concept does not explain or answer everything does
not mean that it does not illuminate anything. I am not persuaded that it is so
hazy that it should be discarded in thinking about judicial review of adminis-
trative action, 26 and I take comfort in the fact that, unless they are dissem-
blers, judges of the first rank are of a similar persuasion.27
The notion of deference is also troublesome. It is not a well-defined
concept but rather an umbrella that has been used to cover a variety of judicial
19. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Sometimes the agency view is
scarcely mentioned. See, e.g., Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 102 S. Ct. 2071, 2080 n.
12, 2082 n. 15 (1982).
20. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 162-79.
21. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980).
22. 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 30.03, 30.04 (1958), holds this view. But see
L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 592-93, who notes that the Davis argument is largely dependent upon
the premise that courts must decide all questions of law.
23. "The Court has previously noted the vexing nature of the distinction between questions
of fact and questions of law .... Nor do we yet know of any ... rule or principle that will
unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion." Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102
S. Ct. 1781, 1789-90 (1982).
24. See E. Cassirer, Language and Myth 44-55 (Langer trans. 1946). See also Symposium,
Law and Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982). In the field of constitutional law, we are
witnessing a round of skeptical thinking inspired not by epistemology but by the "Deconstruc-
tionism" debate in literature. See, for example, the exchange between Fiss, Objectivism and
Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982), and Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 Stan. L.
Rev. 765 (1982).
25. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961). I presuppose a non-Marxist
approach to law here. Cf. H. Collins, Marxism and Law 10-16, 94-115 (1981) (from a Marxist
perspective, concept of law not important).
26. For an enlightening discussion, see L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 546-94.
While the concept of law is analytically relevant in determining judicial deference to adminis-
trative fact-finding, it is less helpful in determining how much judicial deference to give to a
particular legal interpretation. As Part V of this Article argues, that determination must ulti-
mately rest on the court's view of legislative intention in allocating law-making power. See infra
text accompanying notes 141-86.
27. For citations, see Byse, Scope of Judicial Review in Informal Rulemaking, 33 Ad. L.
Rev. 183, 183, 193; Levin, supra note 11, at 580-81 & n.69.
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approaches. Indeed, we are admonished to view deference as a complex
phenomenon best understood "as a collection of rules of statutory construc-
tion, any of which may be applicable depending upon the circumstances of the
particular case." 28 For our purposes, however, more precision is necessary. As
Professor Byse says, "[t]he question is not whether the agency's interpretation
shall be 'considered' or 'taken into account.' The precise problem is the extent
to which the agency's interpretation shall affect or control the court's inter-
pretation. 2 9 Deference, to be meaningful, imports agency displacement of
what might have been the judicial view res nova-in short, administrative
displacement of judicial judgment. Where there is meaningful deference, the
agency, not the court, supplies at least part of the meaning of the law.
Deference in this sense includes judicial decisions purporting to accept "rea-
sonable" agency statutory construction,"0 as well as judicial use of deference
principles to resolve statutory "uncertainty"-a tie-breaker, so to speak-
invoked when the court accepts the agency interpretation because it is satisfied
that there is no one "correct" resolution of the statute's meaning. 3' These
formulations involve deference in a strong sense.
Statutes must, of course, be initially interpreted by the administrative
officials charged with their enforcement. But, as Professor Vile says:
The difference between these interpretations and those of the judge,
however, is the authoritative quality of the judicial interpretation,
whereas those of other officials, although usually accepted as valid,
are in principle subject to review. The importance of this distinction
cannot be lost sight of in the constitutional system of government,.
. .[otherwise] we should indeed live in a society in which the bureau-
crat, however benevolent, had the last word.
32
Our inquiry is the extent to which the Constitution controls the allocation of
functions between court and administrative agency in statutory interpretation.
Suppose, therefore, that Congress were to enact a reverse Bumpers amend-
ment-making explicit that a court must accept every published administrative
statutory interpretation so long as it has a "reasonable basis in law," and, if
you wish, so long as the "subjects fall within the agency's jurisdiction." Such
a statute might constitute unwise policy and might on occasion offend some
specific constitutional provision, such as the first or fifth amendments. But
does Marbury stand as a general constitutional interdiction of such an appor-
28. See Woodward & Levin, supra note 12, at 333.
29. Byse, supra note 27, at 191 (emphasis added).
30. As Professor Byse puts it:
Closely related to the judicial practice of accepting the agency's statutory interpreta-
tion unless it is irrational or unreasonable is the often stated formula that the reviewing
court will accord "deference" or "great deference" to the agency's interpretation. I
believe that if these terms are to be given their ordinary or dictionary meanings, (and I
see no reason why they should not be so understood), they ... closely resemble the
irrational or unreasonable formulae ....
Id. at 192 (footnotes omitted).
31. See infra text accompanying note 177.
32. M. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 328 (1967).
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tionment of functions? If it does, the legitimacy of much of the present
structure of the American system of administrative law is called into question.
I think the Marbury argument fails, and an understanding of why that is
so throws some light on the basic premises of our system of judicial review.
My submission, in brief, is this: judicial review in both constitutional and
administrative law involves textual interpretation by the courts. In constitu-
tional adjudication, 33 Marbury indicates that the court's interpretational duty
is that of supplying the full meaning of the relevant constitutional provisions
(except for "political questions"). By contrast, judicial review of administra-
tive action contains a question of the allocation of law-making competence in
every case, given congressional power to delegate law-making authority to
administrative agencies. The court's interpretational task is (enforcement of
constitutional restrictions aside) to determine the boundaries of delegated
authority. A statement that judicial deference is mandated to an administra-
tive "interpretation" of a statute is more appropriately understood as a
judicial conclusion that some substantive law-making authority has been con-
ferred upon the agency. Where deference exists, the court must specify the
boundaries of agency authority, within which the agency is authorized to
fashion authoritatively part, often a large part, of the meaning of the statute.
By contrast, to the extent that the court interprets the statute to direct it to
supply meaning, it interprets the statute to exclude delegated administrative
law-making power. In this context, the agency view of what the statute means
may persuade, but it cannot control, judicial judgment.
A road map for what follows may prove helpful. Part II emphasizes the
pervasiveness of the requirement that the Court independently determine the
meaning of the Constitution. The origins of this rule are traced to Marbury's
premise that the judicial role in constitutional adjudication is not distinctive
but simply an extrapolation from the traditional judicial role in nonconstitu-
tional settings. Part III considers why the Court has not over time seen the
"judicial duty" as inconsistent with deference to administrative construction
of law. It suggests that the principal reason was the early emergence of a
distinction between "public" and "private" rights. This distinction initially
permitted claims against the government to be adjudicated in nonarticle III
tribunals, and it was ultimately extended to permit administrative adjudica-
tion, at least initially, of all claims generated by the administrative state, even
those between private parties. Several decisions indicated, however, that
whenever an article III court was being asked to enforce governmentally
prescribed duties against private parties the "judicial duty" requires indepen-
33. 1 do not overlook the fact that the constitutional questions may arise outside the
adjudicatory context-for example, where no plaintiff has standing, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reserv-
ists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). This Article is concerned with the nature of
the judicial duty. Moreover, while Marbury may be taken to have established that the Court's
constitutional interpretation is final as to the litigants, it does not follow that other branches of
government, particularly the coordinate branches of the national government, are obligated to
treat it as authoritative. See G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 25-35 (10th
ed. 1980). But the practical force of this latter point is greatly diminished by the role of stare
decisis and by the explosion of class action litigation.
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dent judicial determination of all questions of law. Part IV elaborates upon
that latter theme, particularly in connection with Henry Hart's effort to frame
the appropriateness of judicial deference as a function of a distinction be-
tween "enforcement courts" and article III courts acting in other contexts.
Part IV concludes by criticizing the coherence and utility of Hart's distinction.
Part V argues that once the delegation of law-making competence to adminis-
trative agencies is recognized as permissible, judicial deference to agency
interpretation of law is simply one way of recognizing such a delegation. The
Article concludes in Part VI by suggesting that the central constitutional
problem is that of vindicating the values of limited government, that our
tradition is that the court's role is simply to keep the administrative agencies
within the boundaries of delegated power, and that in fact this circumscribed
role is not unlike the judicial role in much constitutional adjudication as well.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION AND THE
INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT RULE
A. The Rule
Marshall's emphasis on the law-declaring "duty of the judicial depart-
ment" is a cornerstone of the American constitutional order. 34 The question
is, what is the precise scope of that duty? In 1893, James Bradley Thayer, in
the most influential essay ever written on American constitutional law,35
argued for a narrow formulation. Stressing that the political organs were the
primary addressees of the major constitutional provisions, 36 Thayer insisted
that the constitutional design sanctioned only an "incidental and postponed
[judicial] control." 37 Legislation is open to judicial condemnation, he insisted,
only if Congress could be said to have made a "very clear [mistake],-so clear
that it is not open to rational question." ' 38 Quite arguably, Thayer's concep-
34. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974).
35. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv.
L. Rev. 129 (1893). Thayer's general theory that judicial review was intended to restrain only
plainly ultra vires governmental action proved attractive to great judges. Mendelson, The Influ-
ence of James B. Thayer Upon the Work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 Vand. L.
Rev. 71 (1978); see also L. Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958). Cf. H. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix
Frankfurter 128-32 (1981) (arguing that while Frankfurter, Holmes, and Brandeis all endorsed
Thayer, each did so for different reasons and to differing degrees).
36. Thayer, supra note 35, at 135-36.
37. Id. at 136.
38. Id. at 144. Thayer conceded that different considerations might come into play when
state legislation was involved. Id. at 154-55.
Thayer's general argument for limited review may need some additional fine tuning. In some
situations, such as the sixth amendment, it is at least arguable that the courts themselves are the
primary addressees of the constitutional mandate. Indeed, such an argument could be made with
respect to the issue presented in Marbury itself. See Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional
Concept of Administrative-Constitutional Law (pt. 1), 69 W. Va. L. Rev. 111, 119-20 (1967). But
a "defensive" theory of the judicial power established by Marbury seems to me question-begging
on the facts of Marbury itself given the wide power over jurisdiction conferred on Congress by
article III. In any event, it has never been developed to limit the judicial duty posited by Marbury
in constitutional cases. See R. Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court 154-65 (1969).
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tion reflected the common understanding of how judicial review would actu-
ally operate under the new Constitution; in pronouncing an act invalid, a
court would simply be ratifying a legal conclusion readily apparent to every-
one from the face of the Constitution, 39 as, for example, judicial invalidation
of an act establishing a national church. Arguably too, Thayer's formula
draws some support from early decisions of the Supreme Court.40 But in the
end it has proved too simplistic. Twentieth-century efforts to develop a stable,
coherent body of constitutional doctrine have generated modes of reasoning
and the elaboration of doctrinal distinctions that Thayer could not have
countenanced or perhaps even have imagined. 4'
Marbury itself, our most important decision, cuts hard against Thayer's
standard. In Marbury, it will be recalled, the Court invalidated section 13 of
the 1789 Judiciary Act 42 as an impermissible attempt to enlarge the Court's
original jurisdiction beyond the three categories specifically named in article
I11. 43 Powerful, and to my mind convincing, arguments can be made that the
named categories stated only the irreducible minimum, not the maximum, of
original jurisdiction.44 Surely, at least, Congress could not be charged with a
"clear mistake" on this issue. 45 But the Court did not posit "the duty of the
judicial department" in such restricted terms. The question of congressional
power to expand the original jurisdiction was a straightforwardly "legal" one,
and the Court saw its duty as requiring independent judgment on the meaning
of article III. There was no suggestion that this obligation could be discharged
39. See Thayer, supra note 35, at 133-34 (quoting Swift, System of the Laws of Connecticut
50 (1795), denying judicial review except of acts "so manifestly unconstitutional that it would
seem wrong to require the judges to regard it in their decisions"). See also R. Berger, supra note
38, at 335-46 (judicial review intended to reach only plain acts of unconstitutionality).
40. See, for example, Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803), and McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819), both of which place great weight upon the
contemporary interpretation given to the Constitution by other organs of government.
41. See generally Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 199 (1970). Alexander Bickel rejected Thayer's standard when the meaning of specific
constitutional limitations were at stake: such a standard, he argued, would empty the constitu-
tional limitations of meaning. But, interestingly, he apparently endorsed Thayer's standard when
the only issue was the reach of the affirmative powers of Congress. A. Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch 35-45 (1962). See also J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political
Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (1980), arguing that in
the latter circumstance there should be no judicial review. Choper's argument is criticized in
Monaghan, Book Review, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 196 (1980).
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-76. The strained character of the Court's reading of § 13 has, of
course, been frequently noted. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
1969 Duke L.J. 1, 14-16. Of course, § 13 was invalidated only to the extent that it purported to
authorize an original writ of mandamus. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 582 (1943).
43. "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2, cl.2.
44. See Van Alstyne, supra note 42, at 30-33.
45. Perhaps the problem is more complicated than put in the text. Marshall himself may
have thought that Congress had in fact made a clear mistake. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 174-75. But Thayer does not so read the case, and surely the language of article III
governing the original jurisdiction would bear alternative constructions. Moreover, nothing in the
legislative history of article III was before the Court, and even if it had been, it would not have
impelled any specific result.
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by judicial deference to Congress simply because its interpretation had a
"reasonable basis in law."
Viewed simply as a matter of logic, the judicial duty "to say what the law
is" does not demand an independent judgment rule; it is in fact quite consist-
ent with a clear-mistake standard. For example, the political question doc-
trine, such as it is,46 most properly represents a judicial conclusion that the
meaning of a constitutional provision has been allocated by the Constitution
to another branch of government. 47 To be sure, this commitment-to-another-
branch rationale necessitates some judicial interpretation, including a require-
ment that the Court specify the boundaries of what has been allocated else-
where. But this process entails judicial interpretation of a limited order, and,
more importantly, it acknowledges that some of the meaning of a constitu-
tional provision can be authoritatively supplied by another branch of govern-
ment. The point can be put more generally: the judicial duty "to say what the
law is" is analytically empty. The judicial duty to decide demands nothing
with respect to the scope of judicial review; it is, therefore, entirely consistent
with such propositions as, "the Constitution means what Congress says it
means, so long as the congressional determination is a reasonable one."
'48
But here, as elsewhere, Holmes's page of history is worth a volume of
logic. 49 The Court and the profession have treated the judicial duty as requir-
ing independent judgment, not deference, when the decisive issue turns on the
meaning of the constitutional text,50 and that specific conception of the
judicial duty is now deeply engrained in our constitutional order. 51 Thus,
when in Katzenbach v. Morgan5 2 the Court, implicitly reviving Thayer, appar-
46. One might question whether such a doctrine continued to exist after Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). In any event, the
doctrine's internal logic is subject to criticism. See Henkin, Is There a "Political Question"
Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J. 597 (1976). Nonetheless, the doctrine seems still alive. See Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (four justices found that the question of whether the President could
terminate a treaty without the participation of Congress was a nonjusticiable political question).
47. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-8
(1959); Henkin, supra note 46, at 600-01, 606, 612. Compare G. Gunther, supra note 33, at 1688-
96, arguing that the political question doctrine comprises more than simply, as Wechsler argues,
textual commitments to other branches; it includes cases where there is a lack of judicially
manageable standards. But even if this were true, the conclusion would be the same: the task of
giving content to the meaning of the constitutional provisions has been committed to a nonjudi-
cial organ.
48. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts,
1801-1835, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 646, 658 n.77 (1982) ("[I]t would be quite consistent with a judicial
duty to declare the law to find that the law commits to Congress the decision whether it has acted
within its powers.")
Indeed, it is quite consistent with accepting the view that the Constitution means what a
private party says. Some argue, for example, that what constitues "religion" for purposes of the
free exercise clause is wholly or substantially a matter of private interpretation. See, e.g., Merel,
The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First
Amendment, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 805 (1978).
49. Holmes's language appears in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
50. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858,
2866-67 (1982) (plurality opinion).
51. See generally Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on
Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 Va. L. Rev. 333, 413-38 (1982).
52. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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ently deferred to a "reasonable" congressional interpretation of the equal
protection clause, 53 a dissenting opinion 54 and commentators5 5 voiced objec-
tion and this aspect of Morgan simply withered. 6 Efforts by sponsors of the
so-called "Human Life Statute ' 5 7 to overturn Roe v. Wade8 by ordinary
legislation have encountered a similar condemnation. In discharging its duty
to say what the law is, the Court had, it was noted, squarely held that a fetus
was not a "person" within the meaning of the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses. 59 Legislative judgments to the contrary, however reasonable, are
simply constitutionally out-of-bounds. 60
Two concluding points concerning the judicial duty in constitutional
adjudication bear emphasis in view of the discussion that follows. First, the
judicial duty to supply all the relevant meaning of the constitutional text may,
at first glance, seem attributable to the binary nature of the issues presented:
either Congress can or it cannot enlarge the original jurisdiction, regulate the
manufacturing process under the commerce clause, or reach private conduct
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. With respect to issues of this
character, it is hard to think of the Court as simply prescribing boundaries for
the political branches, leaving to them the ultimate ordering of judicially
approved criteria. But much of the Court's work in supplying the meaning of
consitutional provisions does not involve simple binary choice. Consider, for
53. Id. at 656. ("[lIt is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate
a judgment that the application of [the state statute] constituted an invidious discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.").
54. Id. at 665-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment does
not give "Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the Amendment"). See also
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (same).
55. See Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81. See also
Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean what It Always Meant?, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1029,
1047-48 (1977) (arguing that the framers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend, in the
enforcement clause, to give Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the equal
protection clause, and suggesting that the "wisdom of the Court's action may be doubted"). But
see Cox, supra note 41, at 228-30.
56. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), Morgan's author, Justice Brennan, at-
tempted to reformulate Morgan in terms of judical deference to legislative fact finding. Id. at
248-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). But see Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due
Process Rights, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1265, 1270 n.37 (1980) (arguing that Justice Brennan's views
concerning Katzenbach v. Morgan did not command a majority in Oregon v. Mitchell; and noting
comments that Oregon v. Mitchell "says little about the scope of Morgan and § 5"). Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), confirms the point in its discussion of congressional enforce-
ment power under the fifteenth amendment. Id. at 172-78. In Rome, the Court made no reference
to the "reasonable interpretation" language of Morgan.
57. S. 158, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
58. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59. Id. at 157-58.
60. See the sources collected in Estreicher, supra note 51, at 336-37 n.4; see also Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3336 (1982). The most prominent defense of the
proposed statute is S. Galebach, The Human Life Review 5 (1981), reprinted in 127 Cong. Rec.
S289 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981), relying, inter alia, upon Morgan's assertion that Congress can pass
on the "meaning" of the Constitution, and, alternatively, upon an assertion that the crucial issue
turns not on the "meaning" of the Constitution, but on a question of legislative fact: when does
life begin?
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example, the diverse range of possible rules governing warrantless searches
and seizures, procedural safeguards required by due process in the administra-
tive context, media defamation, or state aid to parochial schools. Here, too,
the Court has undertaken to specify the precise content of what is required by
the Constitution. 61
Second, there is no suggestion that the judicial duty of article III courts
"to say what the law is" with regard to constitutional questions varies with
the nature of the case in which the question arises. Thus, no one supposes that
Congress could confine judicial inquiry into any such questions arising in, say,
a case challenging the denial of a government benefit, to a determination
whether Congress had made a clear mistake.62 There is no half-way position in
constitutional cases; so long as it is directed to decide the case, an article III
court cannot be "jurisdictionally" shut off from full consideration of the
substantive constitutional issues, at least absent adequate opportunity for
consideration of those claims in another article III tribunal. 63 Whether the




The origins of Marbury's independent judgment rule warrant elabora-
tion. They will seem strange to many contemporary students of the American
61. Cf. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 18-26, 40-45 (1975) (arguing that many rules are constitutional common
law, not true constitutional interpretation).
62. The classic judicial statement is by Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944):
It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is entirely another to confer
it and direct that it be exercised in a manner inconsistent with constitutional require-
ments .... [W]henever the judicial power is called into play, [the Court] is responsible
directly to the fundamental law and no other authority can authorize the judical body to
disregard it.
Id. at 468. Hart refers to the "great and generating principle of this whole body of law-that the
Constitution always applies when a court is sitting with jurisdiction in habeas corpus." Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 17, at 353. The point seems of general applicability. See id. at 316. Compare
Hart's apparent view that a court's duty to provide independently the meaning of statutes that
have been applied by administrative agencies may be narrower in cases challenging the denial of a
government benefit than in cases in which the government is seeking to enforce the statutory
duties of private parties. See infra text accompanying notes 119-40.
63. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 352-53. See also id. at 316. See generally Young,
Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein
Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1189, 1215-24. See supra text accompanying note 43.
64. The Court routinely reads apparently sweeping preclusion provisions as not embracing
constitutional claims. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974), holding that 38
U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976), which provides that "the decisions of the Administrator on any question
of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for
veterans.. . shall be final and conclusive and no... court of the United States shall have power
or jurisdiction to review any such decision," does not bar federal courts from deciding the
constitutionality of veterans' benefit legislation). See also Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 348-
56. Cf. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 102 S. Ct. 2498 (1982) (reading the Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), to deprive federal district courts of jurisdiction over constitutional
challenges to state tax laws where there is a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the state courts).
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political-constitutional order. Nonetheless, they reflect deeply held premises
that profoundly affected nineteenth and early twentieth-century thinking
about the nature of judicial review, and their impact is still apparent in the
case law. 65
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall makes no effort to defend judicial
review in terms of the superior institutional capacity of courts to develop a
coherent and stable corpus of constitutional doctrine.00 Nor does he appear to
view the substance of constitutional adjudication as special.0 7 Rather, Mar-
shall simply extrapolates the judicial role in constitutional cases from the
"ordinary and humble judicial duty" 6 in conventional cases. Law interpreta-
tion is what courts "do":
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each.
So, if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law
and the constitution apply to a particular case .... the court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is
of the very essence of judicial duty.
69
Marshall's premise was widely shared. Hamilton, for example, had earlier
defended judicial review in virtually identical terms:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of
the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the
judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascer-
tain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act pro-
ceeding from the legislative body.
70
Thus, as Thayer noted, the argument for judicial review "went forward
as smoothly as if the constitution were a private letter of attorney, and the
court's duty under it were precisely like any of its most ordinary opera-
tions. 17 1 Judicial review is no more than "the mere and simple office of
65. See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363,
1365-68 (1973).
66. But cf. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 82 (emphasizing that the Court possesses
advantages over political organs in terms of procedures for making and recording decisions).
67. Cf. F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 307 (1927) (constitu-
tional adjudication differs from other litigation in "the content of the material, the nature of the
interests, and the technique of adjudication"); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976) (the object of much modern federal litigation is
increasingly the vindication of constitutional or statutory rights rather than the settling of disputes
between private parties about private rights).
68. Thayer, supra note 35, at 138.
69. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). This statement follows the now little noted but
exceedingly important conclusion that the Constitution is "law" to be noticed by the courts, not
merely a direction to the political branches. Thayer, supra note 35, at 130.
70. The Federalist No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See generally R.
Berger, supra note 38.
71. Thayer, supra note 35, at 139.
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construing two writings... as two contracts or two statutes are construed and
compared when they are said to conflict.
' 72
In this paradigm, the "meaning" of the relevant constitutional provision
is, of course, assumed to be a crucial matter, just as is the meaning of any
other controlling legal instrument. Meaning, in turn, is to be supplied entirely
by the courts; and in the courthouse there is no room for a "reasonable" but
"wrong" interpretation, or for a "no right answer" approach. Rather, as
Thayer put it, the premise is that
the ultimate question ... is one of the construction of a writing;
that this sort of question is always a court's question, and that it
cannot well be admitted that there should be two legal constructions
of the same instrument; that there is a right way and a wrong way of
construing it, and only one right way; and that it is ultimately for the
court to say what the right way is.
73
Thus, Marshall's justification for the existence of judicial review, drawn as it
is from the ordinary workings of the common law courts, also determined its
precise scope: independent judgment.
74
Thayer decried the assimilation of constitutional to ordinary adjudica-
tion. He insisted that the courts too had quickly perceived the wide and
evident dissimilarities between the two kinds of cases, 75 and as a result had
rightly "supplemented" Marbury's "simple precepts" with "a very signifi-
cant rule of administration" 76-the clear-mistake standard. But in Thayer's
hands emphasis on that standard constituted an attempt to restructure the
institution of judicial review as it had evolved from its early nineteenth-
century origins. Early expressions of the clear-mistake standard, and there
were many,77 assumed that courts would independently determine the "mean-
ing" of the relevant constitutional text. By the time Thayer wrote, however,
these conceptions connoted quite incompatible judicial roles in constitutional
adjudication. In stressing the clear-mistake standard, Thayer sought to redi-
rect the focus of judicial review from "meaning" to "validity." "[Tihe
ultimate question is not what is the true meaning of the constitution, but
whether legislation is sustainable or not."
78
Thayer cuts very deep here. He separates, as Marshall did not, the
existence of judicial review from its scope. The courts, Thayer insists, are
72. Id. at 138.
73. Id. at 150.
74. See Monaghan, supra note 65, at 1365-68 (emphasizing the importance of the analogy of
constitutional to common law adjudication in shaping the case or controversy doctrine). Cf. Hart
& Wechsler, supra note 17, at 14-16 (emergence of view that courts have a special function in
constitutional cases not derivable as an incident of the judicial duty to decide cases).
75. Thayer was surprisingly unclear in specifying the dissimilarities. He seems largely to have
focused upon the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality. See Thayer, supra note 35,
at 144.
76. Id. at 139-40.
77. See id. at 140-42. See also Currie, supra note 48, at 664 & n.120. The origin of this rule
of administration seems to be in judicial fears that the emerging institution of judicial review
would meet popular resistance because it was "undemocratic." See Thayer, supra note 35, at 144.
78. Id. at 150 (emphasis in original).
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properly concerned only with whether the congressional conduct has a "rea-
sonable basis in law." The clear-mistake standard
recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex, ever-unfolding
exigencies of government, much which will seem unconstitutional to
one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another;
that the constitution often admits of different interpretations; that
there is often a range of choice and judgment; that in such cases the
constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific
opinion, but leaves open this range of choice; and that whatever
choice is rational is constitutional. This is the principle which the
rule that I have been illustrating affirms and supports.1 9
But Thayer's effort to divorce meaning from validity, however plausible, has
not prevailed. Meaning and validity are joined, not separated, in our system
of judicial review. And meaning is a matter for the "judicial department,"
not Congress.8" (This, at least, is the formal doctrine, although, as I shall
show in Part VI, it oversimplifies the complexities of constitutional adjudica-
tion.)
III. MARBURY, PuBLIc ADMINISTRATION AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
Marbury's justification for judicial review, grounded as it is in the "ordi-
nary and humble judicial duty" of the common law courts, seems necessarily
to entail a general obligation of independent law-exposition by article III
courts. This is what courts "do"; it is their "job." Thus it is part of the
nondisclaimable "judicial power" of courts established under article III.
Indeed, in view of Marbury's derivation of the right of judicial review from
the workings of the courts in ordinary cases, judicial deference to agency
interpretation of law is plainly anomalous. Applied systematically to the field
of public administration, the essentially common-law conception of the judi-
cial duty would have established a strong basis for judicial control of adminis-
trative law-interpretation. For, unlike the legislature, administrative agencies
can never pretend to an unlimited power to select among goals; the universe of
each agency is limited by the legislative specifications contained in its organic
act.
But whatever the logic of the Marbury argument or the wisdom of strong
judicial control of administrative law-making, the Marshall court itself gave
early sanction to deference principles. United States v. Vowell"I was a suit to
enforce a bond given for custom duties owed on salt, and the case turned on
when the duty had accrued. Chief Justice Marshall's one paragraph opinion
for the Court noted that "[i]f the question had been doubtful, the court would
79. Id. at 144.
80. This is not to deny that the language of deference has rhetorical use. See Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-69 (1981). But the Court's "recognition" of a "healthy deference" to
congressional judgment in Rostker was in the end directed to the issue of legislative fact finding,
not the controlling legal standards. See id. at 69-71.
81. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368 (1809).
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have respected the uniform construction which it is understood has been given
by the treasury department of the United States upon similar questions."
8 2
Marbury is not mentioned in that opinion, nor is it mentioned in the
other scattered deference opinions of the Marshall Court.8 3 As the nineteenth
century wore on, and public administration became a larger and larger com-
ponent of the American governmental system, judicial expressions of defer-
ence increased.8 4 Marbury proved no barrier to this development.
Marbury's lack of impact on administrative interpretation of law seems,
in significant measure, to be part of a much larger development construing
narrowly the potential demands of article 111.85 Article III could have been
read to require that, at least in the states if not the territories, Congress must
assign all the adjudicatory business specified in article III to the courts estab-
lished under its authority or to the state courts.8 6 But the Court quickly
concluded that some adjudication could take place outside of article III (or
state) courts: "public rights"-claims by private individuals against the gov-
ernment and certain claims by the government against private parties for such
matters as custom duties and, perhaps, taxes 7-could, if Congress so chose,
be left entirely to final administrative determination. 8 Summarizing these
developments in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,8 9 the Court said:
[Nonarticle III legislative] courts also may be created as special
tribunals to examine and determine various matters, arising between
the government and others, which from their nature do not require
judicial determination [by an article III court] and yet are suscepti-
ble of it. The mode of determining matters of this class is completely
within congressional control. Congress may reserve to itself the
power to decide, may delegate that power to executive officers, or
may commit it to judicial tribunals. 90
This gloss on article III was by no means inevitable, but quite plainly it
had fundamental significance for the future development of the administrative
state, with its need for administrative adjudication, formal and informal, of a
wide range of claims. And perhaps from the premise that disputes over public
rights could be kept entirely from the article III (and state) courts, it seemed
82. Id. at 372.
83. See United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 15 (1833); United States v. State Bank
of North Carolina, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 39-40 (1832); Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827).
84. For an extensive citation of the cases, see Annot., 73 L. Ed. 322, 325-29 (1928).
85. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. Const.
art. III, § 1, cl.l.
86. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2882-
83 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). Since the Framers quite clearly assumed that Congress need not
have created any inferior courts, they must have assumed that state courts would enforce federal
policy. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 103-04 (1981 Supp.).
87. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 334 & n.7.
88. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284
(1856), is the leading case.
89. 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
90. Id. at 451 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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but a small step to a conclusion that, where those courts were utilized,
deference was permissible. Such an inference does not follow, however. There
is, in principle, a clear difference between excluding the article III courts
entirely from a case and restricting their law-declaring competence once "judi-
cial power" is, in fact, brought to bear on a controversy. 9'
Be that as it may, throughout most of the nineteenth century there was,
despite Marbury, only limited judicial control of administrative law-interpre-
tation. Judicial control was at its maximum when coercive governmental
conduct was involved, particularly where, as in the customs and tax areas, the
judicial process itself was utilized to enforce the duties of private persons. To
be sure, expressions of deference were common enough in this context, but
they were of uncertain import. Often they amounted to little more than a
statement that the administrative view should be taken into account. And
although the administrative view seemed, on occasion, to tip the judicial
scales, it seems fair to say that the cases fell well short of judicial acceptance
of a clear-mistake standard.
92
Judicial control of noncoercive government conduct, particularly admin-
istrative denial of government benefits, was another matter.93 Judicial review
could have been entirely excluded with respect to such claims, 4 and where it
was available it was of a limited nature. Mandamus and injunction actions
seeking to review administrative interpretation of law in connection with the
denial of pensions, land grants, and other largesse were frequently barred by
the rule that these remedies reached only the violation of plain, nondiscre-
tionary administrative duties. 5 Decatur v. Paulding,6 a suit for a pension,
made plain that no such showing could be made where administrative discre-
91. See supra note 62.
92. See, e.g., Robertson v. Downing, 127 U.S. 607, 613 (1888) ("[the] construction of the
department has been followed for many years"); Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 374, 382
(1874) ("[the administrative construction,] though not controlling, is not without weight, and is
entitled to respectful consideration"); Peabody v. Stark, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 240, 243-44 (1872)
("while we do not hold such ruling [of the administrative office] as in general obligatory upon us,
we are content to adopt it in this case").
93. There was no statutory procedure for a private party to seek review of an unfavorable
administrative order. Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 Geo.
L.J. 287, 295-97 (1948).
94. "[Tlhe United States, when it creates rights in individuals against itself, is under no
obligation to provide a remedy through the courts." United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331
(1919). See also supra notes 88 & 89. The absence of this obligation was particularly self-evident
since nineteenth-century political and social thinking could neither absorb nor comprehend the
premises of modern entitlement theory. Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 117, 128 (1978).
Sovereign immunity may have played a large role in the emergence of these deference
principles. It cannot explain judicial deference completely, however, for "public rights" included
certain claims by the government against private parties. E.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
95. Lee, supra note 93, at 296. See also L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 337-38. The influences of
these remedial concepts persisted well into the twentieth century. Lee, supra note 93, at 297 n.31.
Cf. id. at 304 (discussing the Court's tendency after the turn of the century to defer to administra-
tive fact-determination).
96. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 514-16 (1840). The Court was late in coming to recognize that
discretion has its boundaries, and that the crucial issue was the scope of agency discretion. See
Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925).
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tion extended to questions of law. Any other rule, the Court said, would
sanction excessive judicial intrusion into the domain of public administra-
tion.
97
History, if not logic, is thus squarely against the wide assertion of
Bumpers amendment proponents that article III courts can never yield to
administrative constructions of law. But there has always been in our tradi-
tions particular concern with the judicial role where governmental interference
with the "private rights" of "liberty" and "property" was involved.
8 This
linkage is reflected in Marbury's declaration that the "province of the Court
is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals," '9 and it constituted a vital
component in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century efforts at demarcating
the permissible limits of administrative power. So long as public administra-
tion made few demands on private persons (apart from taxes and custom
duties) no threat was posed to the "sacred" rights of liberty and property. But
with the advent of the regulatory administrative state in the late nineteenth
century, 00 judicial concern grew. It was a widely shared belief that disputes
arising from the application of congressional regulatory power must ulti-
mately be resolved in article III courts and thus could not be left for final
administrative determination.' 0 ' Judicial power and due process rationales
were tightly joined here;10 2 in fact, the first decision imposing due process
constraints on the states required judicial review of a claim that administra-
tively prescribed rates were confiscatory.
10 3
97. Justice Catron's elaborate concurring opinion disclaimed any judicial supervisions of
claims "to pay money out of the treasury" on this ground, Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)
497, 518 (1840), and his concern was reflected in the majority opinion. "We can readily imagine,"
said Chief Justice Taney, "the confusion and disorder into which [more active judicial interven-
tion] would throw the whole subject ... ; which now forms so large a portion of the annual
expenditure of government, and is distributed among such a multitude of individuals." Id. at 515.
Mr. Lee notes that between 1838 and 1880 the Court failed to order mandamus with respect
to any executive action. Lee, supra note 87, at 295. Note, however, that even if direct review were
not permissible, it appears that the legal issue could have been litigated in a private action where
the court would not have been bound by prior administrative decisions on law. Decatur, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) at 515. See also L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 338.
98. Thus Professor Jaffe, in his plea for recognition of "public" actions, "categorically and
arbitrarily assert[s] that the highest, the central, and the most realizable function of our courts is
the protection and relief of the individual." L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 475.
99. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (emphasis added). See also id. at 162-63, 167 (stressing
judicial protection for vested rights). The linkage is, indeed, rooted in English history, L. Jaffe,
supra note 5, at 330, and accepted by writers on public administration, see supra note 6.
100. While the federal administrative process existed in rudimentary form in 1789, it is
"customary and appropriate to date the present federal [administrative] era from the creation of
the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887." L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 9.
101. See Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 912-17 (1930).
102. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 379-80. See also R. Berger, supra note 38, at 16-22 (discussing
the historical background concerning protection of private rights); Katz, supra note 101, at 917
(same result under article III even if fifth amendment had never been adopted). As Professor
Jaffe notes, a judicial power rationale is not theoretically confined to the protection of individual
interests, but its use beyond that sphere raises separation-of-powers problems. L. Jaffe, supra
note 5, at 380.
103. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). See A.N. Paul, Conserva-
tive Crisis and the Rule of Law; Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1887-1895, at 39-45 (1960).
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The tension between the demands of public administration and the judi-
cial protection of private rights is reflected in Crowell v. Benson, 04 the most
important modern decision. But Crowell recognized that it was now too late to
cut back significantly the necessary apparatus of the modern state. It not only
reconfirmed the public right cases, but it went still further, permitting, subject
to limited judicial review, administrative adjudication of the duty of one
private person to another arising out of governmental regulatory programs.
Crowell, in sum, sanctioned a wide area for the operation of public adminis-
tration, removing article III as a meaningful barrier to the use of administra-
tive agencies to establish and enforce, at least initially, all the rights created by
the administrative state. 05
It bears noting that the complex opinions in last term's Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 10 confirm Crowell. There the
defendant successfully resisted an ordinary breach of contract suit brought in
a nonarticle III bankruptcy court by a corporation in reorganization. A
divided court concluded that the exercise of such jurisdiction violated article
III because it "impermissibly removed most, if not all, of 'the essential
attributes of the judicial power' from the Article III district court."' 10 7 But the
difficult plurality opinion not only purported to reaffirm the public rights
cases, 10  but also emphasized, 09 as did the concurring opinion," 0 that the
claim sued upon did not originate in federal statutory law. It appears, there-
fore, that common law rights must generally be litigated in either article III or
state courts, and perhaps cases of governmental claims against private parties
and claims of one individual against another arising under federal law consti-
tutionally require the pattern of limited judicial review confirmed by Cro-
well."' Even so, the crucial point remains and warrants emphasis: administra-
tive agencies can adjudicate, sometimes conclusively, claims created by the
administrative state, by and against private persons.
But that fact simply underscores our inquiry. Whether required by the
Constitution or not, our system of administrative law typically provides for
104. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
105. The seventh amendment has not proved to be a barrier to this development. Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
106. 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
107. Id. at 2879-80.
108. Id. at 2869-72.
109. Id. at 2875-78.
110. Id. at 2881-82.
111. But see The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 260 (1982) (interpreting
Northern Pipeline as holding that the authority of legislative courts, even when the right being
sued upon originates in a federal statute, "extends neither to interpreting the law nor to entering
judgment; these " 'essential attributes of the judicial power' " must remain with article III
judges" (citation omitted)).
A footnote in the plurality opinion, id. at 2870 n.23, suggested that judicial review might be
required even in cases of government largesse, a suggestion sharply at variance with the decided
cases, see supra note 95, but one that draws some support from recent due process developments
in the administrative context. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process
requires evidentiary hearing before termination of welfare benefits, and may require judicial
review).
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judicial review of the application of administrative power insofar as it directly
affects specific individuals. At least when called upon to enforce an adminis-
trative order against a private person, must an article III court, as in a
constitutional case, independently supply all of the relevant law, or is it
sufficient that the court simply determine whether the administrative construc-
tion is a reasonable one? In Crowell, Hughes and Brandeis disagreed on
whether, "in order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial
power, '"" 2 an article III court must render independent judgment upon-
indeed, perhaps independently find-all the "constitutional facts" underlying
the administrative order." 3 But both judges stressed that the controlling
statute reserved all questions of law, constitutional and nonconstitutional, for
independent judicial determination." 4 Indeed, Brandeis subsequently asserted
that "[t]he supremacy of law demands that there shall be an opportunity to
have some court decide whether an erroneous rule was applied.""15 In Yakus
v. United States,"6 to take another leading example, the Court sustained a bar
to the jurisdiction of an article III court to consider questions of law in a
criminal proceeding brought to punish violation of an administrative regula-
tion, but only because full review of those issues had been located in another
article III court. 17 To be sure, in these cases questions of substantive constitu-
tional law were prominent on the surface, but the Justices did not indicate that
they saw any difference in judicial duty between constitutional and conven-
tional legal issues in considering the validity of the administrative orders they
112. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.
113. Compare id. at 54-65 (the Court per Chief Justice Hughes holding that article III courts
must independently determine all "constitutional facts"), with id. at 84-88 (Justice Brandeis
arguing in dissent that "constitutional facts" may be determined "otherwise than judicially").
See generally Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. Rev. 223
(1968) (analyzing the role of the doctrine after Crowell).
114. 285 U.S. at 54 ("[Ajnd the reservation of full authority to the court to deal with matters
of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of cases."); id. at
88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
102 S. Ct. 2854, 2876-77, 2878-79 (1982) (plurality opinion) (relying on Crowell's outline of the
judicial function); L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 88-89, 638, 643 (analyzing the significance of both
the Crowell decision and the Hughes-Brandeis dispute).
115. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Brandeis, however, seems here to be referring to the requirements of due process, not
to a judicial duty derived from article III. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 643-44. See generally White,
Allocating Power Between Agencies and Courts: The Legacy of Justice Brandeis, 1974 Duke L.J.
195, 223-32 (1974) (discussing Crowell).
116. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). Cf. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943) (holding that
Congress has the constitutional power to prescribe the equity jurisdiction of inferior federal
courts as to enforcement of the Emergency Price Control Act).
117. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 444-45. The Court construed the law limiting its jurisdiction as
authorizing the enforcement court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the limitation but
precluding review of administrative regulations and orders. Id. at 429-31. See also Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (reaching the same result in a suit brought by the government
seeking to enjoin a proceeding in a state court to restrain administrative actions). Congress seems
more and more inclined toward such limits on judicial review. See, e.g., Harrison v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 n.9 (1980); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 289-90
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring). Cf. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976) (avoiding review
of an obscenity decree in a state prosecution on the ground that the "in rem" proceeding in which
the obscenity issue was determined did not sufficiently protect defendant's first and fourteenth
amendment rights).
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were asked to enforce. These cases thus could be read to support a constitu-
tional interdiction of judicial deference to administrative law-interpretation,
at least where a private party was resisting coercive governmental action. "1
IV. THE DALOGUE
A. The Structure
Retaining the traditional concern with the role of the courts in the protec-
tion of private interests, Hart's Dialogue is an effort to unpack the notion that
a person has a right to invoke judicial aid in challenging illegal governmental
conduct affecting him."" While Hart retains the general distinction between
coercive and noncoercive governmental conduct, he introduces important
refinements. His central innovation is an insistence that the article III courts
have special responsibilities when they themselves are the medium for the
application of coercive governmental power against private parties-when, in
other words, they are being asked to enforce the governmentally prescribed
duties of private parties.
Hart begins with the proposition that such an enforcement court can
always examine the validity of any limitation on its law-declaring competence:
It's only a limitation on what a court can do once it has jurisdiction,
not a denial of jurisdiction, that can hurt a defendant. And if the
court thinks the limitation invalid, it's always in a position to say so,
and either to ignore it or let the defendant go free. Crowell v.
Benson and the Yakus case make that clear, don't they?12
0
And an enforcement court must make the examination not because of any
specific constitutional guarantee (such as due process), but because that task is
an essential attribute of the duty of the judicial department. "That's the
reason, isn't it, why Hughes invokes Article III as well as the Fifth Amend-
ment in Crowell v. Benson? As he says, the case was one 'where the question
concerns the proper exercise of the judicial power in enforcing constitutional
limitations' "121
The most neglected, and to my mind the most frustrating, part of the
Dialogue is its discussion of the precise duties of an enforcement court. It
seems to me incontrovertible that an enforcement court can and must examine
118. See L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 385-89 (arguing that due process requires full judicial
review of law wherever the government engages in coercive conduct-whether the coercion is as a
result of judicial or administrative process).
119. See supra note 17.
120. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 336. Technically Crowell was not an enforcement
proceeding but a suit by the employer to set aside an administrative order-in effect, a suit for a
declaration of nonliability. But the result would have determined the employer's duties in a
subsequent enforcement suit. Thus Hart rightly insists that the court was "in the position of an
enforcement court," and he persuasively argues that as a matter of statutory construction, a court
should, as it did in Crowell, permit a prospective defendant to raise in an advance challenge all
issues that would be open to him in a subsequent enforcement proceeding. Id. at 337-38. My use
of "enforcement court" includes both contexts.
121. Id. at 337.
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the validity of any limitations on its law-declaring competence, and that some
limitations might offend specific constitutional guarantees. But does the arti-
cle III "duty of the judicial department" mandate the invalidity of every
limitation on the scope of law-declaring competence of an enforcement court?
Is deference always impermissible? Hart apparently believes so. 12 2 His empha-
sis, I want to stress, is on Marbury as well as Crowell:
Q. The Crowell case also has a dictum that questions of law,
including the question of the existence of evidence to support the
administrative decision, must be open to judicial consideration. And
you quoted Brandeis as saying that was necessary to the supremacy
of law. Have those statements stood up?
A. If I can speak broadly and loosely, I'll say yes-they have
stood up.
Shutting off the courts from questions of law determinative of
enforceable duties was one of the things Yakus assumed that Con-
gress could not do. To be sure, that was a criminal case; but there's
no reason to suppose the Court would have made a different as-
sumption if the sanction had been civil.
Name me a single Supreme Court case that has squarely held
that, in a civil enforcement proceeding, questions of law can be
validly withdrawn from the consideration of the enforcement court
where no adequate opportunity to have them determined by a court
has been previously accorded. When you do, I'm going back to re-
think Marbury v. Madison.
Q. You put a lot of weight on the point of whether an enforce-
able legal duty is involved, don't you?
A. Yes.'
23
The anti-deference thesis is, I recognize, somewhat ambiguously urged.
Hart seems to require independent judicial determination of all questions of
law, as is apparent from his discussion of criminal prosecutions like Yakus1
2 4
and his visible consternation over use of the then emerging reasonable-basis-
in-law standard of review in civil enforcement cases, 2 5 a matter to which I
shall return. Still, less than complete precision inheres in such references as
"shutting off the [enforcement] courts from questions of law," as having such
questions "withdrawn" from those courts, or in stating (as a reviser's foot-
note adds) that " 'we find not a single clear-cut authority for unreviewability
122. Curiously, in an enforcement case Hart seems quite willing to accept without murmur
judicial deference to administrative fact finding, id. at 338-39-a part of the otherwise "ordinary
and humble" judicial task. The argument is not self-evident, as is indicated by the strained
analysis in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); see also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2877 (1982) ("[WIhile Crowell ... endorsed the
proposition that Congress possesses broad discretion to assign fact-finding functions ... to aid in
the adjudication of congressionally created statutory rights, Crowell does not support the further
proposition ... that Congress possesses the same degree of discretion in assigning traditionally
judicial power to adjuncts engaged in the adjudication of rights not created by Congress.")
123. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 340-41 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in last sentence
of fourth paragraph added).
124. Id. at 341-44.
125. Id. at 340.
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at the obligation end of the scale.' ",126 The crucial question, however, is not
the bare existence of judicial review on questions of law but its precise
scope. 12 7 The Dialogue provides no basis for any halfway house for an en-
forcement court on "legal" questions; Hart's thesis, as Jaffe paraphrases it,
seems to demand that "insofar as the judicial power is invoked in the enforce-
ment of [administrative] order[s], a court must apply all of the relevant
law."' 28 If Hart's position is in fact consistent with some measure of defer-
ence, his analysis is, at the very least, in need of very considerable clarifica-
tion.
B. Criticism
Hart contrasts enforcement proceedings with "denials" of jurisdiction to
plaintiffs complaining of unfavorable administrative conduct. In the latter
cases, the court is not being asked to establish and enforce the plaintiff's own
legal duties; rather, plaintiff seeks judicial assistance to redress unfavorable
administrative action. 129 In denial of jurisdiction cases, unlike enforcement
proceedings, the important questions are, Hart insists, whether there is a
substantive right to judicial review 30-a point on which the distinction be-
tween coercive' 31 and noncoercive 32 administrative action may be impor-
tant-and whether vindication of any such right may be confined by Congress
to the state courts.
133
There is intuitive appeal to this structure. The nature of the judicial duty
of article III courts is made to vary with whether the court is hurting people,
126. Id. at 341 n.20 (quoting 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 104 (1958)).
127. Professor Jaffe is guilty of eliding these different issues in his discussion of Hart. He
cites Hart's analysis for the proposition of a constitutional right to review without noting that
Hart was concerned with the scope of review, see L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 383-84.
128. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 384 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
129. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 344-59. As indicated in supra note 120, this category
does not include cases where plaintiff's suit anticipates a future enforcement proceeding against
him.
130. The right may stem from the due process clause, or from the specific provisions of the
bill of rights. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 520-24,
543-51 (1970). Or it might be thought to inhere in the constitutional provision concerning habeas
corpus, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 357.
131. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 348-60.
132. Id. at 344-48. This includes, as a special case, id. at 344, cases where plaintiff seeks
review of the denial of an administrative order that would impose duties on other private persons.
Hart treats this issue as part of the larger issue of plaintiff right of access to courts to enforce the
duties of other private parties. Id. at 344-46. But where that issue manifests itself as a denial of an
administrative order, it is, as Hart observes generally, closely akin to the general problem of
noncoercive administrative orders.
133. The denial of jurisdiction is not self-executing, wholly beyond judicial scrutiny. E.g.,
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850).
Hart remarks that "a necessary postulate of constitutional government" is a requirement that "a
court must always be available to pass on claims of constitutional right to judicial process, and to
provide such process if the claim is sustained." Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 336. The
source of this implication is not made clear. In any event, a right to judicial review does not
automatically translate into access to the federal courts, since, as Hart recognizes, the state courts
can discharge the requirement. Id. at 330, 359. Most discussions of congressional authority over
jurisdiction center on the denial of review problem. See generally Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
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or simply refusing to help them. 134 Where an article III court is itself the
medium for the application of coercive governmental power, the judicial duty
is that of independent law exposition. Otherwise, the question is whether due
process or some other provision of the Constitution grants a right of judicial
access to some court, if not an article III court. But Hart's analysis is, I think,
in the end unsatisfying even on its own terms. The distinction between en-
forcement and nonenforcement courts is not only incomplete, it rests upon an
undefended and unpersuasive constitutional premise.
Hart's treatment of what he characterizes as "denial of jurisdiction"
warrants close examination. Hart focuses upon complete denials of jurisdic-
tion to challenges by private parties complaining of unfavorable administra-
tive conduct. 35 Here the central problem has been the right to any judicial
review, not the scope of review. 136 But the now far more common pattern is
that of "restricted review." The court is given statutory jurisdiction to review
an administrative order such as the denial of a government benefit, but one or
more of its functions are restricted by a deference principle; for example,
judicial review of facts may be confined to a substantial-basis-in-the-record
standard, and judicial review of law limited to a determination whether the
administrative order has a reasonable basis in law. Restricted review impli-
cates not the right to judicial review, but its scope. The restricted court is like
the enforcement court: each has jurisdiction; each has the function of law
declaration restricted; and each "is always in the position to say [that the
limitation is invalid]." Hart assumes without discussion 137 that where a com-
plete denial of jurisdiction would be valid, restricted judicial review is also
permissible. But this is true only if we focus on coercion rather than judicial
involvement in thinking about the nature of the judicial duty. From the latter
perspective, the matter looks quite different. In a denial of jurisdiction case,
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress's Authority to Regulate the Jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17 (1981).
134. Suppose that the employee in Crowell had lost and sought judicial review. Hart insists
that this would not be an enforcememt proceeding. "The employee in the supposed case simply
failed to gain a hoped-for advantage." Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 345. See also L. Jaffe,
supra note 5, at 388 ("But if the agency sends the worker away empty-handed... [h]e is not the
object of judicial enforcement.").
135. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 344-48. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation
Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943), is an excellent modern example. A union was held to lack the
authority to invoke general federal question jurisdiction to set aside a board order designating a
rival union as the authorized collective bargaining representative. Hart argues that the complain-
ing union "did not come under any enforceable duty not to bargain, . . . [a]ll it lost was the
liberty to bargain with an employer free from an enforceable duty not to bargain with it." Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 17, at 345.
136. Hart's "denial" discussion also includes cases where plaintiff seeks review of an
administrative determination refusing to impose duties on another private party. The difficulty of
finding a right to judicial review is substantial here. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and
Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1203 (1982). No analogous common law right could be
drawn upon, id., and remedial limitations inherent in both mandamus and injunctions recognized
administrative discretion in construing the law. Adequate judicial control of administrative
conduct in this area raises important issues in contemporary administrative law. Id. at 1204-20.
137. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 348 ("Suppose, further, that [Congress] not
only dispenses with judicial enforcement but either limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
inquire into what the officials do or denies it altogether.").
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the court plays no further role if the preclusion is valid; the parties are left
where they were before entering the courthouse. In a restricted review case, as
in an enforcement proceeding, "judicial power" is brought to bear to resolve
the controversy in an authoritative manner.
Functionally, Hart's definition of an enforcement court exempts private
suits against public officials to enforce their statutory duties from a demand
that courts supply all the relevant law. But so long as the court has general
jurisdiction to render a final judgment, why should the permissible limitations
on the court's law-declaring competence vary with whether the private litigant
is asserting rights rather than defenses? This is a particularly troublesome
question given Hart's concession that the law-declaring competence of a
nonenforcement court cannot be restricted on constitutional issues.' 38 More-
over, it should be recalled that Hart cites both Crowell and Marbury in
addressing the validity of limitations on enforcement courts with respect to
conventional legal issues. But Marbury, of course, was itself a proceeding to
enforce the duties of a public official.1
39
To my eye, the Dialogue leaves undefended the proposition that the
nature of the judicial duty mandated by article III in cases in which the court
has jurisdiction to enter a final judgment should turn on whether the individ-
ual's rights, duties or "interests" are at stake. Such a position cannot be
derived from the language of article III, the thinking of the Framers, or the
long history of judicial concern with the protection of private rights. Nor is
the position functionally appealing, whether the judicial duty be viewed insti-
tutionally (law declaration is what courts "do") or in terms of the benefits
supposedly conferred upon litigants by the independent article III tribunals. 40
It seems to me far more congruent with the premises of article III, as stated
and as they have evolved in our legal tradition, to insist that exercises of "the
judicial power of the United States" cannot vary with whether a private
litigant is a plaintiff or a defendant, so long as the court is expected to enter a
final judgment on the merits of the claim.
Further exploration of Hart's analysis can be pretermitted, however. A
significant run of administrative law cases will fall into his enforcement court
category, and we may take this as the strongest case for the proposition that
the Constitution controls the degree of deference that article III courts may
properly accord "reasonable" agency interpretations of statutory law. If it
does not, Hart's emphasis on the special character of enforcement courts
possesses no real utility insofar as it is directed to this issue.
138. See supra notes 62 & 63.
139. Marbury might be explained as prefiguring the insight that "entitlements" can consti-
tute "property," but if that rationale were adopted, it would sweep into the enforcement category
much of the current judicial review of government largesse, to say nothing of the cases involving
administrative coercion. Marbury, however, cannot be so contained. Whether or not the property
label is affixed to the particular government largesse at issue, the object of a suit seeking to review
its administrative denial can always be plausibly structured as an enforcement proceeding, an
action to vindicate a legal duty against an otherwise unwilling public official.
140. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2864-66
(1982).
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V. DELEGATION AND MARBEURY
A. Agency Law Making and the Judicial Function
The Lockean principle that the grant of legislative power is one "only to
make laws, and not to make legislators' 4' has fallen before the inexorable
momentum of the administrative state. 42 "Delegation of 'lawmaking' power
is the dynamo of modern government," 43 a fact underscored by the explosion
of agency rule-making in the last two decades. Fidelity Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. De la Cuesta'44 is only the most recent illustration that
"legislation" is not a finished product when it leaves Congress. There, a
Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulation, issued pursuant to the Board's
power over the "operation" of federally chartered thrift institutions, was held
to have pre-empted a state law restricting enforcement of due-on-sale clauses
in mortgage loans. The Court disclaimed any authority to disturb " 'a reason-
able accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agen-
cy's care by the statute.' ,,145 Rather, the Court said, "[w]here Congress has
directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are subject
to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory
authority or acted arbitrarily.' '1 46
The current fashion is to decry the sweeping delegations of law-making
authority conferred upon administrative agencies. 47 But any of the proposed
formulae for limiting legislative delegations acknowledges that considerable
law-making power could be properly conferred upon an administrative
agency. 148 Once the propriety of agency law making is recognized, the analytic
141. J. Locke, Second Treatise On Civil Government § 141. On the controverted intellectual
basis of the anti-delegation doctrine, see S. Barber, Constitutional Delegation and the Delegation
of Congressional Power 11-51 (1975). For a recent survey of the cases, see Note, Rethinking the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 62 B.U.L. Rev. 257 (1982).
142. But see Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
673-75 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
143. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 33 (footnote omitted). Delegation is "the instrument through
which the close fusion of executive and legislative functions required by the complex nature of
modern government may be brought about under a constitution committed to the eighteenth-
century doctrine of separation of powers." Wilse, The Representative Function of Bureaucracy,
35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 510, 511 (1941), quoted in Freidman, supra note 4, at 281 n.24. See, e.g.,
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-
26 (1977).
144. 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982).
145. Id. at 3022 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S 374, 383 (1961)).
146. Id. (citation omitted).
147. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 4, at 78-94; see also the sources cited in I K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise, at 149-223 (1978); Note, supra note 141, at 257 n.3. It has been
noted that the Framers feared legislative usurpation, not the bureaucracy. Freedman, Book
Review, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 307, 308-09 (1976). But this is a weak point, since they gave no
attention to, nor could they have envisaged, the dimensions of modern delegation. Cf. Grund-
stein, supra note 3, at 304 (anti-delegation principle limited to presidential delegations and wholly
inapplicable to delegations to administrative agencies).
148. Dean Freedman, for example, would revive earlier suggestions that Congress must
resolve "controverted" issues of policy. Freedman, supra note 4, at 80. Professor Barber also
would require that Congress resolve "salient" policy issues. S. Barber, supra note 141, at 44, 49-
51. Unless these terms are used in a Pickwickian sense, they entail considerable subsidiary
administrative law-making authority.
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problem is considerably simplified. Judicial deference to agency "interpreta-
tion" of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making
authority to an agency. 49 To take a very modest example, Congress may,
within limits, expressly authorize an agency to define "employees" within the
labor acts through the exercise of substantive rule-making power. 50 Precisely
the same kind of law-making delegation is achieved if, instead, Congress
mandates judicial deference on that issue to either an "interpretive" agency
rule or to the results of agency adjudication having "a reasonable basis in
law." In each instance, the crucial judicial question is the scope of the
authority delegated to the agency. There is, therefore, no constitutional
significance to the asserted distinction between substantive and interpretive
rule making;' 5' if interpretive rule making is coupled with a Hearst-like defer-
ence principle, it is, from a legal perspective at least, the functional equivalent
of substantive rule-making authority. 5 2 Where deference is not given to an
interpretive rule, the result is that norm elaboration authority has not been
delegated to the administrative agency; the agency rule simply constitutes
advice to the public as to the position which the agency is prepared to enforce
and, ultimately, to defend in court.
It is in light of agency competence to make law that the "duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is" must be evaluated. The question is
put whether "the power of the Congress to define the law's content give[s]
Congress unlimited discretion to allocate between the judiciary and the execu-
tive the power to interpret the law as it is enforced against the citizen's person
or property?'1 53 It may very well be that some specific constitutional provi-
sions (such as the first, fifth, and sixth amendments) are relevant here as
limitations.'5 And the nondelegation doctrine of article I could impose some
limits at least at the margins, prohibiting, for example, a legislative scheme
that is tantamount to making the agency interpretation of the reach of its
statutory mandate wholly conclusive upon the courts. 55 But unless one is
149. That point seems to be recognized in Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 933 n.21 (3d
Cir. 1982). See also J. Landis, The Administrative Process 150-51 (1938).
150. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
151. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (contrasting substantive and interpre-
tive regulations); see 2 K. Davis, supra note 147, at §§ 7.8-7.16 (1979), for an extensive discussion.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, however, Congress's failure to grant substantive rule-
making authority may well be read as a decision not to delegate law-making power. Deference
would then be inappropriate. See infra notes 184-85.
152. The notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
553 (1976), should, therefore, apply. See 2 K. Davis, supra note 147, at 1-156 (1979). I recognize
however that, dynamically viewed, both the agency and the court might be inclined to view their
tasks as somewhat different in the two situations.
153. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 343 n.23.
154. E.g., Monaghan, supra note 130. No one, for example, believes that Congress could
authorize direct administrative enforcement of criminal penalties. See Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389 (1973).
155. This is unlikely to occur in fact. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419-20
(1944) (sustaining grant of price-fixing authority where administrator is charged with effectuating
general statutory objects such as price stabilization and where his regulations must " 'in his
judgment ... be generally fair and equitable' "). See also Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. De la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982), discussed supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
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prepared to rethink fundamentally the role of public administration in our
constitutional order, article III, standing alone, is not violated by judicial
deference to administrative construction of law. Enforcement of other consti-
tutional restrictions aside, the only judicial task is to determine what statutory
authority has been conferred upon the administrative agency. 15 Once it has
done so, the court has discharged its duty to say what the law is.15 This is no
novel perception. Robert Stern put it accurately long ago:
The duty of the courts in reviewing the administrative decision for
error of law is to see that the agency has stayed within the bounds
for the exercise of discretion fixed by Congress, and that it has
applied the statutory standards and no others. As long as the agency
does so, the courts are not to substitute their judgment .... [T]he
function of the reviewing court in determining the "law" in this
field is to search for legislative intention, which of course would
include an intention to vest the administrator with discretionary
power, and then to decide whether the administrative ruling is con-
sistent with it.1
58
To say that the "court-not the agency-must decide what the statute
means" seems to me potentially misleading, at least without elaboration.159
To be sure, the court must interpret the statute; it must decide what has been
committed to the agency. Frequently the court will (or should) understand the
statutory mandate as directing it, not the agency, to supply all or most of the
relevant meaning. In these circumstances, the agency view is a datum, a highly
relevant one, but a datum only; "it is only one input in the interpretational
equation."'160 On other occasions, to borrow from Brandeis, "the function of
the courts is not one of review but essentially of control-the function of
keeping [agencies] within their statutory authority."''1 The court's task is to
fix the boundaries of delegated authority, an inquiry that includes defining the
range of permissible criteria. In such an empowering arrangement, responsi-
bility for meaning is shared between court and agency; the judicial role is to
specify what the statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but not
all that it does mean. In this context, the court is not abdicating its constitu-
156. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944) ("determination of
the extent of authority given to a delegated agency by Congress is not left for the decision of him
in whom authority is vested").
157. I do not see that any distinctive problems are involved if Congress authorizes an agency
to issue rules and gives it, not the courts, authority to specify what the rules intended. Fidelity
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3025 & n.13 (1982).
158. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analy-
sis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 106-07 (1944). See also Winter, Judicial Review of Agency Decisions:
The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 53, 67-70; Levin, supra note 11, at 588-90.
See also W. Chase, The American Law School and the Rise of Administrative Government 60-63,
141 (1982).
159. Byse, supra note 27, at 191. Professor Byse accurately links his demand with keeping
the agency within its statutory authority.
160. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 192 (1969).
161. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 89 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
See also L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 569 (common law courts recognized the idea of a zone of
administrative discretion).
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tional duty to "say what the law is" by deferring to agency interpretations of
law: it is simply applying the law as "made" by the authorized law-making
entity. Indeed, it would be violating legislative supremacy by failing to defer
to the interpretation of an agency to the extent that the agency had been
delegated law-making authority.
B. Hearst Publications
The well-known case of NLRB v. Hearst Publications162 is a paradigmatic
illustration of the foregoing principles. Hearst involved the status of adult
newsboys as "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act. The
Court applied the reasonableness standard to this "specific [agency] applica-
tion of a broad statutory term,' '11 3 but only after independently determining
that the Act was not intended to incorporate either specific state law or a
generally distilled common-law standard for distinguishing between employ-
ees and independent contractors. 16 4 Rather, the Court opined, the statute's
content must be discerned "primarily from the history, terms and purposes of
the legislation,"'' 6 5 upon which it expounded at considerable length. 10 The
judicial duty was, in the end, not that of fully defining the meaning of
"employees," but one of instructing the agency as to the boundaries of its
law-making competence.1
6 7
Hart's description of Hearst, concededly an enforcement case, is worth
examining:
Q. How do you explain cases like Gray v. Powell, and National
Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc.? ... Didn't
these cases allow the agencies to make final determinations of ques-
tions of law?
A. That depends on how you define "law". I think Professor
Davis is right in saying that the term "law" in the first sentence I
quoted from Justice Brandeis has to be read "as excluding the body
of rules and principles that grow out of the exercise of administra-
tive discretion"-at least while the rules are in process of crystalliz-
ing. Davis, Administrative Law 34 (1941).
In recent years we've recognized increasingly a permissible
range of administrative discretion in the shaping of judicially en-
forceable duties. How wide that discretion should be, and what are
the appropriate ways to control it, are crucial questions in adminis-
162. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
163. Id. at 131.
164. Id. at 120-24.
165. Id. at 124.
166. Id. at 124-29.
167. See also NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216
(1981). There the Court agreed with the Board that all confidential employees were not impliedly
excluded from the Act's coverage. While extensively analyzing the Board's views and paying
respect to its expertise, the Court quite plainly reserved this issue for its own independent
judgment. Id. at 222-26. But the Court invoked Hearst in sustaining the board on a narrower
issue-the implied exclusion of those employees possessing access to confidential labor relations
information. It was enough, the Court said, that this aspect of the Board's conclusion had a
"reasonable basis in law." Id. at 228.
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trative law. But so long as the courts sit to answer the questions, the
spirit of Brandeis' statement is maintained. And, since discretion by
hypothesis is not law, the letter of it is not in question.1
6 8
This account is not satisfying. The opposition of "discretion" to "law"
cannot dissolve Harts problem. 69 Jaffe seems to me entirely correct in de-
scribing administrative discretion as the process of combining statutorily rele-
vant factors into a decision. There can be "no determining rule for combining
such factors,'1 70 although a court could properly determine whether one or
more factors had been given either excessive or insufficient weight.' 71 But the
result of the exercise of discretion is, as it was in Hearst, an administrative
formulation of a rule of law.1
72
For constitutional purposes at least, the Hearst deference doctrine cannot
plausibly be confined to cases of statutory "application" as opposed to
statutory "construction," or to "mixed" rather than "pure" questions of
law. 7 3 Administrative application of law is administrative formulation of law
whenever it involves elaboration of the statutory norm.174 In any event,
distinctions between "construction" and "application" have never been em-
168. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 340 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
169. Hart seems to have viewed agency "discretion" much as Holmes viewed the jury,
Holmes, The Common Law 125-26 (1881); L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 553-54: as a preliminary
facet of law making, a description of a process of experimentation.
170. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 556.
171. See id. at 555-56. Cf. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635, 641-49 (1982) (excessive judicial discretion at remedial
stage threatens judicial legitimacy).
172. See also Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 102 S. Ct. 720 (1982). The
Court there sustained the Board's view that a bargaining impasse does not justify an employer's
unilateral withdrawal from a multiemployer bargaining unit, concluding that the Board had
"confined itself within the zone of discretion entrusted to it by Congress," id. at 727. The Court
added that the dissent "is quite right that this case turns in major part on the extent to which the
courts should defer to the Board's judgment with respect to the critical factors involved." Id.
173. If such lines were viable it might be argued that such limited judicial deference to
administrative construction of law does not involve according agencies law-making power in any
significant sense. Analogy might be made to the distribution of functions between judge and jury
on the "application" of statutory norms to facts. That issue, it is contended, cannot be resolved
ex ante by appeal to intrinsic differences between questions of law and of fact, but instead must be
decided functionally, on a statute-by-statute basis. H. Hart and A. Sacks, supra note 119, at 369-
85. Whether the judge should reserve the issue for himself as one of "law" depends upon an
assessment, albeit often intuitively made, of such factors as how much more norm elaboration can
be meaningfully provided, how fact-dependent the specific problem is, and how importunately the
situation disclosed by the evidence calls for certainty and predictability. A similar condition
obtains in the allocation of functions between court and agency in the administrative law context,
it could be argued. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 576. But even so, this parallel is not illuminated by
the judge-jury analogy. Speaking generally, but I think accurately, little significant norm elabora-
tion is left to the jury, and such as there is is entirely swallowed up in the ad hoc character of the
jury's verdict. By contrast, the deference standard, in anything but a very weak form, suggests
significant agency discretion in elaboration of the statutory norm, even accepting the premise that
the agency is confined to employing judicially approved criteria. Presumably, an agency decision
could go either way, and would be sustained by a reviewing court. Such a power to choose
authoritatively (and, unlike a jury, with precedential effect) among significantly different modes
of conduct seems to me, as it has to others, to constitute agency law making, id. at 575-76, with
the court accepting the administrative version of the statute's content.
174. See the discussion in L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 562-64, and sources cited in Levin, supra
note 11, at 337-38 & 339.
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ployed to measure what law-declaring authority Congress can confer upon an
administrative agency. The substantive rule-making cases make that plain.175
Hearst sheds considerable light on two other problem areas. First, defer-
ence concepts are frequently invoked when the court seems uncertain that
there is one correct interpretation of the statute.176 Why a feeling of uncer-
tainty should generate a conclusion of deference is not clear. 77 My preference
is to view these cases as, in principle, reducible to Hearst: the agency has been
invested with authority to fill in the meaning of the statute, so long as its
formulation has a "reasonable basis in law." Second, there is talk, particu-
larly in substantive rule-making cases where deference notions are particularly
strong, that, loosely read, might suggest that the central issue for the review-
ing court is whether the administrative interpretation of the statute is "not
irrational" or "sufficiently reasonable.' ' 78 That is misleading, unless it is
understood to rest, as in Hearst, upon an anterior judicial conclusion that the
agency is acting within the zone committed to it. The case law can be rational-
ized on such a basis-whether or not all cases were in fact decided with such a
perception clearly in mind. 79
175. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977).
176. Some decisions seem to reflect such an "uncertainty principle." For example, in Train
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975), the Court acknowledged that
whether a state variance procedure in an implementation plan under the Clean Air Act was a
"revision" or a "postponement" presented a "question [that] does not admit of an easy answer."
Id. at 75. In sustaining the agency view, the Court noted, "[wlithout going so far as to hold that
the Agency's construction of the Act was the only one it permissibly could have adopted," that
"[the agency's construction] was at the very least sufficiently reasonable that it should have been
accepted by the reviewing courts." Id. Compare United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 102 S. Ct.
821, 828 (1982) (Commissioner's view "is not a reasonable statutory interpretation"), with
Peabody v. Stark, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 240, 243 (1872) ("In the absence of a clear conviction on the
part of the members of the court on either side of the proposition in which all can freely unite, we
incline to adopt the uniform ruling of the office of the internal revenue commissioner .... ).
177. I must confess that I have never understood why judicial doubt should produce a
conclusion of deference. The argument from the comparative expertise of the agency seems to me
no stronger here than elsewhere. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 576-85. But see Levin, supra note 11,
at 579. More importantly, to the extent that the deference suggestion is grounded upon a general
no-right-answer epistomology, it encounters fundamental systemic difficulties. Ex ante it may be
that no one conclusion as to what a statute means is ineluctable. Nonetheless there is, in our
system, no room for the Scottish verdict of "not proved" on questions of law. The presupposition
of the entire legal system is that the court must choose and what it chooses is correct. Thus the
Court, for example, continuously chooses between plausible statutory interpretations. The eases
in which courts defer in the face of uncertainty must be understood as simply delegations to the
agency of a norm-elaboration function.
178. E.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980); Federal Election
Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 102 S. Ct. 38, 46 (1981).
179. Two decisions in the last term are illustrative. In Federal Election Comm'n v. Demo-
cratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 102 S. Ct. 38 (1981), the Court took that view of the statute,
saying:
Hence, in determining whether the Commission's action was "contrary to law," the
task for the Court of Appeals was not to interpret the statute as it thought best but
rather the narrower inquiry into whether the Commission's construction was "suffi-
ciently reasonable" to be accepted by a reviewing court. To satisfy this standard it is not
necessary for a court to find that the agency's construction was the only reasonable one
or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a
judicial proceeding.
Id. at 46 (citations omitted). But the Court framed the issue in these terms only after rejecting the
court of appeals's conclusion that the agency's view contradicted the "plain language" of the
[Vol. 83:1
MARBURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LA W
C. The Present
It is worth noting that the fundamental insight of the Hearst case seems
to be reflected in the current version of the Bumpers amendment. 80 Once
again, the proposed amendment requires that the reviewing court shall "inde-
pendently" decide "all relevant questions of law, [and] interpret ... statutory
provisions.""" But it adds that, in so doing, the court shall "take into account
the discretionary authority provided to the agency by law."' 18 2 And it requires
that the court independently determine "whether the agency's action is within
the scope of the agency's jurisdiction."' 8 3 Considered as a whole these provi-
sions seem to me to capture the right point: the judicial task is to confine the
agency within the zone of authority committed to it. But neither the new
version of the Bumpers amendment nor Hearst does more than frame the issue
of central concern to administrative lawyers: when, in discharging its duty to
interpret the statute, is the court, rather than the agency, expected to supply
the meaning of a statute? At the day-to-day working level, judicial review of
administrative law interpretation contains divergent elements in need of a
unifying theory. Of course, much necessarily will turn on the particular
statutory configuration. 84 But can one fashion any general working principles
that will at least point to the proper allocation?8 5 That is a subject for another
day. 88
statute, id. at 42-44, and after engaging in an elaborate review of the policy of the Act and its
legislative history, id. at 44-46. Similarly, Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta,
102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982), contained an elaborate review of the relevant legislative history, id. at
3025-29.
180. See supra note 12.
181. Bumpers Amendment, supra note 12, § 203(a).
182. Id. § 203(c).
183. Id.
184. Analytically, the.degree of deference that a court should give any agency interpretation
of law is properly, within broad constitutional limits, entirely a matter of legislative intent.
Recognizing that fact, however, will not generally prove very helpful, for legislatures do not often
provide much evidence of their intention to delegate law-making power. Consequently, rules tying
the degree of deference to be accorded agency action to the type of agency action involved may
become necessary. But see supra note 152. Any such rules, however, remain residual rules: they
may not trump evidence of a contrary legislative intent.
185. Some obvious elements of the theory are whether the agency has substantive rule
making authority, and the precise form in which the agency construction occurred. In Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), for example, the Court did not face the issue of deference in
the context of review of an agency decision, but rather in a suit between private parties. One might
suggest that the agency view was thus too informally reached to be given deference. See also
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). But the Court has refused deference even where the agency
view was expressly in the context of an adjudicatory proceeding. See, for example, Woelke &
Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 102 S. Ct. 2071 (1982), where the Court sustained the Board's
construction of an exemption provision in § 8(e) of the Act, without even a nod to the Board's
expertise, let alone a mention of Hearst.
186. The Court's brief per curiam at the end of last term in Board of Education of Rogers v.
McCluskey, 102 S. Ct. 3469 (1982), is an interesting illustration of the problem in the federalism
context. The Supreme Court held that in a § 1983 action the federal courts were not authorized to
substitute their interpretation of a local school board's policies for that of the board itself, at least
if the board's interpretation was reasonable. Id. at 3472 (relying on Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 326 (1975)). The Court gave no consideration either to abstention principles or to whether the
state courts would have deferred to the board in these circumstances.
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VI. JuDicIAL DEFERENCE AND BOUNDARIES
A. Limited Government
Marbury proceeds, at least in part, upon an apparently unified concep-
tion of the judicial function: as the authoritative expositors of law, courts are
required to make an independent judicial judgment on the content of the
applicable law, whether the legal question is constitutional or statutory. Any
line of attack on this position might seem to require a strong separation
between constitutional and nonconstitutional adjudication, a separation made
tenable once the fact of administrative law-making competence is recognized.
But positing such a separation invites one to think further about Marbury
itself. Why the separation? What is the justification for a denial of direct
congressional law-making authority in interpreting the meaning of the Consti-
tution itself? Why not judicial deference here too, as Thayer contended,
particularly if judicial review is analogized not to common law adjudication
but to the role of courts reviewing administrative action?
Marbury itself provides a basis for thinking about this question, and for a
unification of theories of judicial review in constitutional and administrative
law cases. There is much more in that complex opinion than its reliance on the
common law mode of adjudication. Indeed, the suggestion that judicial re-
view can be derived from the "ordinary and humble judicial duty" of the
common law courts has little resonance in the late twentieth century. What has
endured, however, is Marbury's repeated emphasis that a written constitution
imposes limits on every organ of government. 187 Marbury welded judicial
review to the political axiom of limited goverment. That emphasis was no
accident. "Limited government," particularly a fear of legislative usurpation,
was the common bond uniting late eighteenth-century political discussion
about the meaning of such diverse concepts as a written constitution, funda-
mental law, social contract, separation of powers, and federalism.'"8 We have
increasingly come to emphasize the view that the courts have a special func-
tion, that of enforcing constitutional limits, a function that cannot be reduced
to or meaningfully illuminated by the workings of the ordinary courts. The
judicial "duty" to declare the meaning of the Constitution is best viewed as an
aspect of this conception of the role of the courts. If not an ineluctable
inference from the concept of limited government, it is nonetheless a role to
which history has given its sanction, and one around which expectations of the
body politic have come to depend in myriad ways.
Judicial review of administrative action is also concerned with limited
government. "[Tlhere is in our society," as Professor Jaffe says, "a pro-
187. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803). At the end of the nineteenth century, judicial
emphasis on enforcing constitutional limits to achieve limited government was commonplace.
E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
188. Monaghan, supra note 65, at 1371 n.47 (1973). It should be noted that however
frequently limited government and the protection of private rights were joined, eighteenth-century
thinkers did not believe that the protection of private rights exhausted the justification for the
enforcement of constitutional limits. Id. at 1370-71. Nonetheless, the Court continues to struggle
with such a linkage. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982).
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found, tradition-taught reliance on the courts as the ultimate guardian and
assurance of the limits set upon [administrative] power by the constitutions
and legislatures."' 89 But judicial review of administrative action stands on a
different footing from constitutional adjudication, both historically and func-
tionally. In part no doubt because alternative methods of control, both politi-
cal and administrative in nature, are available to confine agencies within
bounds, there has never been a pervasive notion that limited government
mandated an all-encompassing judicial duty to supply all of the relevant
meaning of statutes. Rather, the judicial duty is to ensure that the administra-
tive agency stays within the zone of discretion committed to it by its organic
act.
B. Boundary-Setting in Constitutional Adjudication
What is striking, in the end, is that there is far less discontinuity between
the role of judicial review in administrative law and constitutional law than
one might suspect given the formal demands of the independent judgment
rule. A conception of the judicial role as restraining only ultra vires adminis-
trative action in fact characterizes much of the Court's role in constitutional
adjudication. Wherever the rationality test obtains, Marbury's demand of
independent judicial judgment is a weak one, functionally equivalent to defer-
ence, with the judicial role confined to policing boundaries. Congress, for
example, is empowered to spend for the "general welfare"' 90 and to take
property for a "public use. '" 19 The Court must determine what these words
mean. In so doing, it could, for example, hold that spending to relieve the
economic dislocations caused by the modern industrial order is not among the
goals included in spending for the "general welfare," or that takings that do
not result in wide public use of the taken property are not for a "public use."
Congress would, in turn, be bound by such conclusions. But once the Court
has determined, as it now has, that Congress can spend and take to achieve a
virtually unlimited range of goals, the constitutional standard recedes into a
deep background with the result that the yolitical branches are empowered to
supply much of the operational content of the constitutional clauses.192 The
Court, in short, simply determines whether Congress has exceeded the outer
boundaries of a very wide domain for choice. The same analysis holds true, of
course, where the rational basis test governs substantive review under the due
process or equal protection clauses. The standard is virtually empty because its
189. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 321. See also Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-
Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Supreme Court, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 59-60 (1982).
190. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
191. U.S. Const. amend. V.
192. E.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) ("There is a middle ground or
certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large. .. . The discretion belongs to Congress,
unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.")
For other citations and discussions in connection with this section, see Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 369-72 (1981).
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premises postulate a virtually indefinite number of permissible legislative
goals.
193
Technically, the Court is, in the foregoing examples, supplying the mean-
ing of the constitutional text: it holds, as a matter of constitutional interpreta-
tion, that the political branches are empowered to achieve a broad range of
goals. The legislative choice among possible goals is supportable so long as it
advances some plausible conception of the public good, a determination that
the courts lack the institutional capacity to second-guess except at the mar-
gins. The standard of review is thus necessarily weak, and in its application,
the Court's task is operationally akin to its role in Hearst: setting the bounda-
ries and annulling "clear mistakes.'
1 94
More meaningful operation of the independent judgment rule exists
where the rationality standard is not the controlling legal standard. Even here,
however, it is an oversimplification to think that the independent judgment
rule results in the Supreme Court's supplying all the meaning of the constitu-
tional provision. Constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court are often
only a step in a continuous dialogue by the Court with other decision-makers
in the constitutional-political system, as the exclusionary rule and eighth
amendment cases illustrate. 195 The reactions of Congress, state legislatures,
and state courts often have a decided impact on the Court's elaborations of
constitutional doctrine. To be sure, independent judgment is reserved to the
Court, but its decision as to meaning often reflects the input of other units of
government. Marbury's demand for independent judgment, in sum, while
accurate, does not capture the complexities of constitutional adjudication.1 0
193. See, e.g., U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 178 (1980) (Congress can
sort out railroad employees claiming retirement benefits on the basis of who has a greater
equitable claim). For a rare illustration of an invalid end, see United States Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) (legislative purpose to hurt "hippies"). See also Zobel v.
Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 2315 (1982) (state's scheme of distributing excess dividends from
natural resources that favored established residents over new residents was constitutionally unac-
ceptable).
194. Notice also the large role given Congress where the decisive issue turns not on language
but on "legislative facts." Compare Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981) (deference to legislative fact finding in federalism challenge), with
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-44 (1978) (no deference to state
legislative fact finding in first amendment challenge). See generally Cox, supra note 41. The
court's deference is particularly significant given the difficulty of separating legal from factual
questions. E.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). See also L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law 5-14, at 271 (1978) (law and fact not distinct categories); Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1233 (1978)
(unrealistic to isolate fact-finding from constitutional decisionmaking).
195. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (upholding the death penalty, noting
legislative responses to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976) (same); Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (relying on developments in state courts).
196. 1 am indebted to a wide range of people for their helpful comments on this paper, but I
am particularly indebted to Ira Lupu and Bruce Ackerman for their comments on this section.
